Higher-Orders of Vagueness Reinstated

Dominic Hyde
The role of higher-order vagueness in creating apparent difficulties with attempts to formulate a sentence capable of characterizing the vagueness of a predicate, that is, its role in appearing to undermine a characteristic-sentence approach to defining vagueness, has led some to question the very existence of such a phenomenon. Hyde () sought to put the existence of higher-order vagueness beyond doubt and to do so in a way that showed it to be unproblematic. Varzi () , though sympathetic to the existence claim, argues that the reasoning of Hyde () for that claim is ultimately circular, depending as it does on an argument for the vagueness of 'vague' which itself supposedly assumes the very point at issue. To avoid circularity the vagueness of 'vague' must be argued for independently of this argument of Sorensen () or be taken as obvious. Such is the dialectic so far. By way of rejoinder I think the charge is mistaken. Sorensen's argument is sound and its conclusion available for use in a non-circular argument for higher-order vagueness.
Before dealing with the specific charge of circularity it is worthwhile pausing briefly to bolster the central argument of Sorensen () () Thus, 'vague' has border instances (namely, itself!).
() So, 'vague' is vague.
In summary, if 'vague' is vaguely vague then 'vague' is vague. This is just a particular instance of the more general principle:
(*) If any predicate is vaguely vague then 'vague' is vague, which can be proved by generalizing on the above argument, substituting 'P' for 'vague' in (), () and the first occurrence of 'vague' in () above, and which is the converse of the principle which Tye employs in his reasoning outlined above-also provable by a similar generalization and subsequent reasoning from () to (). Now the inconsistency in Tye's position is apparent since if 'vague' is vague then:
There can be no vagueness concerning the vagueness of 'vague' , vagueness determinately is or determinately is not homological. This much is now obvious. Might it also be obvious which of the two clear alternatives is the case? Despite apparent claims for the affirmative, I think not.
It is true, as Varzi reports, that Austin () speaks of 'the vagueness of "vague"' as being obvious, however 'vague' is a notoriously ambiguous notion and Austin's subsequent discussion (pp. f) strongly suggests a use at odds with the notion here under consideration. Beyond this, I can see no case for an obvious choice. Both Varzi and I choose similarly, 'vague' is vague, but do so on the basis of argument-Sorensen's argument, now reinstated against objections. And this returns us to Varzi's central concern -that so choosing in the context of the subsequent reasoning of Hyde () is objectionable since circular.
So, can one rely on Sorensen's argument for the vagueness of 'vague' in the context of reasoning for the existence of higher orders of vagueness, as Hyde () does? The answer is certainly negative if, as Varzi claims, Sorensen's argument 'presupposes' or 'assumes' the very existence of higher orders of vagueness, that is, the existence of border border cases. This case for presupposition rests on the fact that an assumption of Sorensen's sorites argument for 'vague'-the apparent truth of the inductive premise that Varzi labels (b) -entails that 'small' has border border cases, 3 and obviously, as Varzi points out, 'in the context of Hyde's argument we are not entitled to that assumption, on pain of circularity.' The central issue then is whether or not a logical consequence of an assumption of an argument itself thereby counts as an assumption, that is, whether the set of assumptions of an argument is closed under entailment.
If indeed it is then it would seem that there is no hope for any valid argument for higher-order vagueness that is non-circular, regardless of whether or not it relies on the vagueness of 'vague' . On this view we are confronted with Mill's Problem-all deductively valid reasoning is circular. Any valid argument for C from assumptions A  ,…A n is such that the conjunction of assumptions entails C and therefore their assumption brings in its train the assumption that C, the very proposition to be proved. Something is wrong with the foregoing view. To be sure, a commitment to an assumption brings with it a requirement to accept the truth of its consequences and in this sense one must assume whatever follows from an assumption. But it is only when those entailments are already known that a commitment to an assumption brings with it a requirement that one already believe those consequences and arguments for those consequences by way of the assumption are legitimately counted as circular. Where the entailment is not known and an epistemological gap exists there is no fallacy in displaying that very conse-quence to those unaware of it and subsequently requiring those committed to the assumption to believe the formerly unknown consequence.
All that is required then for the disputed argument of Hyde () to be non-circular is that there be an epistemological gap between its assumptions and conclusion. Varzi's argument effectively establishes the absence of a logical gap in moving from the apparent truth of (b) to the existence of higher-order vagueness but its non-triviality is evidence of just such an epistemological gap. In a context where the existence of higher-order vagueness is in dispute one can legitimately argue for the vagueness of 'vague' by appeal to its soriticality (that is, soritessusceptibility) invoking (b) as Sorensen () does. As Varzi points out in discussing Sorensen's argument, one need simply acknowledge the lack of any clear value of n marking the difference between those numbers that are clearly small and those that are clearly not to appreciate the soriticality, and consequent vagueness, of 'vague' . And this is no more question begging in the context of a dispute concerning the existence of border cases of border cases than is the acknowledgement of the lack of any clear value marking the difference between those numbers that are small and those that are not in the context of a dispute concerning the existence of border cases of 'small'. The absence of border cases would entail the existence of a clear boundary and, since there obviously is none, one can use this fact to motivate belief in the existence of border cases. So too, the obvious lack of any such boundary between clearly small numbers and those clearly not small is evidence of, and can legitimately be used to motivate a belief in, the existence of border border cases. It is one thing to believe that a concept lacks a clear boundary to its application along some relevant dimension, and another to think it possesses border cases. One can have the former belief without the latter, though as it happens a commitment to the latter logically follows from a commitment to the former.
In conclusion, for all that has been said so far we may safely suppose Sorensen's argument to be sound and consider its conclusion available for subsequent non-circular reasoning in support of higher-order vagueness. 4 
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